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In this paper we present experiments on neuro-
evolution mechanisms applied to predator/prey 
multi-character computer games. Our test-bed is a 
computer game where the prey (i.e. player) has to 
avoid its predators by escaping through an exit 
without getting killed. By viewing the game from 
the predators’ (i.e. opponents’) perspective, we 
attempt off-line to evolve neural-controlled 
opponents, whose communication is based on 
partial implicit information, capable of playing 
effectively against computer-guided fixed strategy 
players. However, emergent near-optimal 
behaviors make the game less interesting to play. 
We therefore discuss the criteria that make a game 
interesting and, furthermore, we introduce a 
generic measure of this category of (i.e. 
predator/prey) computer games’ interest (i.e. 
player’s satisfaction from the game). Given this 
measure, we present an evolutionary mechanism 
for opponents that keep learning from a player 
while playing against it (i.e. on-line) and we 
demonstrate its efficiency and robustness in 
increasing and maintaining the game’s interest. 
Computer game opponents following this on-line 
learning approach show high adaptability to 
changing player strategies which provides 





In (Yannakakis et al. 2004), we introduced a 
predator/prey computer game named ‘Dead End’ 
for emerging complex and cooperative behaviors 
among agents through evolutionary procedures. In 
this game the prey (i.e. player) has to avoid its 
eight predators (i.e. Dogs) by escaping through an 
exit without getting killed. Since there are eight 
Dogs on the game field, they are designed to be 
slower than the Player so that the game is fairer to 
play. This game’s fundamental concepts are 
inspired from previous work of Yannakakis et al. 
(2003) where efficient cooperative behaviors, 
supported only by partial implicit communication, 
emerge amongst the agents of a complex multi-
agent environment. 
 
Similar to Luke’s and Spector’s (1996) work on 
the Serengeti world, we view Dead End from the 
predators’ perspective. Our first aim is to emerge 
effective complex teamwork behaviors by the use 
of an off-line training approach, based on 
evolutionary computation techniques, applied to 
homogeneous neural controlled agents (Yao 1999). 
Dogs have to demonstrate good cooperative 
strategies in order to kill the Player and/or to 
defend the Exit. Such behaviors can be aggressive, 
defensive, or a hybrid of the two. Given the 
specific game, we believe that 8 predators are 
enough for cooperative behaviors to emerge. 
 
However, playing a computer game like Dead End 
against well-playing opponents with fixed hunting 
behaviors cannot be regarded as interesting. The 
first stage of experiments on this test-bed, given an 
implicitly defined notion of interest, is presented in 
(Yannakakis et al. 2004). We believe that the 
interest of any computer game is directly related to 
the interest generated by the opponents’ behavior 
rather than to the graphics or even the player’s 
behavior. Thus, when ‘interesting game’ is 
mentioned we mainly refer to interesting 
opponents to play against. In (Yannakakis and 
Hallam 2004), we argue that the interest measure 
proposed (for the well-known Pac-Man game) 
defines a generic measure of any predator/prey 
game. Results obtained from Dead End and 
 presented here give evidence for this interest 
measure’s generality, which defines one of the 
goals of this work. 
 
We present a robust on-line neuro-evolution 
learning mechanism capable of increasing the 
game’s interest (starting from well performing 
behaviors trained off-line) as well as maintaining 
that interest at high levels as long as the game is 
being played. In our Dead End predator/prey 
computer game we require Dogs to keep learning 
and constantly adapting to the player’s strategy 
instead of being opponents with fixed strategies. In 
addition, we explore learning procedures that 
achieve good real-time performance (i.e. low 
computational effort while playing). 
 
Recently, there have been attempts to mimic 
human behavior off-line, from samples of human 
playing, in specific virtual environments. In 
(Thurau et al. 2004) among others, human-like 
opponent behaviors are emerged through 
supervised learning techniques in a first person 
shooter console game. Even though complex 
opponent behaviors are emerged, there is no 
further analysis on whether these behaviors 
contribute to the satisfaction of the player (i.e. 
interest of game). In other words, researchers 
hypothesize --- by looking at the vast number of 
multi-player on-line games played daily on the 
web --- that by generating human-like opponents 
the player gains more satisfaction from the game. 
This hypothesis might be true up to a point; 
however, since there is no explicit notion of 
interest defined, there is no evidence that a specific 





Dead End is a two-dimensional, multi-agent, grid-
motion, predator/prey game. The game field (i.e. 
stage) is a two-dimensional square world that 
contains a white rectangular area named “Exit” 
(see Fig. 1) at the top. For the experiments 
presented in this paper we use the 16 X 16 cm 
stage presented in Fig. 1, which is divided into 
grid squares (of length 0.5 mm). The characters 
visualized in the Dead End game (as illustrated in 
Fig. 1) are a dark grey circle of radius 0.75 cm 
representing the Player and 8 light grey square (of 
dimension 1.5 cm) characters representing the 
Dogs. 
 
The relationship between the Dogs and the Player 
is mutually highly competitive. The aim of a 
Player is to reach the Exit, avoiding the Dogs. On 
the other hand, the aims of the Dogs are to defend 
the Exit and/or to catch the Player. In Dead End, if 
a Player succeeds in arriving at the Exit, this event 
is described as a win. Additionally, if a Dog 
manages to catch a Player, this event defines a kill. 
If there is neither a Player win nor a kill for a 
predetermined large period of time, then the 
outcome of the game is a win again. After either a 
win or a kill, a new game starts. 
 
The Player moves at four thirds the Dogs’ 
maximum speed and since there are no dead ends, 
it is impossible for a single Dog to complete the 
task of killing it. Since the Player moves faster 
than a Dog, the only effective way to kill the 
Player is for a group of Dogs to hunt 
cooperatively. 
 
The simulation procedure of the Dead End game is 
as follows. Player and Dogs are placed in the game 
field (initial positions) so that there is a suitably 
large distance between them. Then, the following 
occur at each simulation step. (a) Both Dogs and 
the Player gather information from their 
environment and take an individual movement 
decision, up, down, left or right. (b) If the game is 
Fig. 1. Snapshot of the Dead End game 
 over (i.e. Player escapes through the Exit, Player is 
killed, or the simulation step is greater than a 
predetermined large number), then a new game 
starts from the same initial positions for the Dogs 
but from a different, randomly chosen, position at 




The difficulty of the Dead End game is directly 
affected by the intelligence of the Player. Its nature 
is significant because Dogs’ emergent behavior is 
strongly related to their competitive relationship 
against it. To develop more diverse agents’ 
behaviors, different playing strategies are required. 
We therefore chose three fixed Dog-avoidance 
and/or Exit-achieving strategies for the Player, 
differing in complexity and effectiveness. The 
non-deterministic initial position of the player is 
devised to provide Dogs with diverse examples of 
playing behaviors to learn from. 
 
Randomly-moving (RM) Player 
A Randomly-moving Player takes a movement 
decision by selecting a uniformly distributed 
random picked direction at each simulation step of 
the game. 
 
Exit-achieving (EA) Player 
An Exit-achieving Player moves directly towards 
the Exit. Its strategy is based on moving so as to 
reduce the greatest of its relative distances from 
the Exit. 
 
Cost-based path planning (CB) Player 
A cost-based path planning Player constitutes the 
most efficient Dog-avoiding and Exit-achieving 
strategy of the three different fixed-strategy types 
of Player. A discrete Artificial Potential Field 
(APF) (Khatib 1986), specially designed for the 
Dead End game, controls the CB Player’s motion. 
The overall APF causes a force to act on the Player 
which guides it along a Dog-avoidance Exit-
achievement path. For a more detailed presentation 
of the CB player, see (Yannakakis et al. 2004). 
 
Any motion strategy that guides a Player to arrive 
quickly at the Exit, avoiding any Dogs and keeping 
to the straightest and fastest possible trajectory, is 
definitely a “good” strategy in terms of the Dead 
End game. Hence, the CB Player presents a “good” 
behavior in this game and furthermore a reference 
case to compare to human playing behavior.  
 
Neural Controlled Dogs 
 
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are a suitable 
host for emergent adaptive behaviors in complex 
multi-agent environments (Ackley and Littman 
1992). A feedforward neural controller is 
employed to manage the Dogs’ motion and is 
described in this subsection. 
 
Using their sensors, Dogs inspect the environment 
from their own point of view and decide their next 
action. Each Dog receives input information from 
its environment expressed in the ANN’s input 
array of dimension 6. The input array consists of 
the relative coordinates of (a) the Player, (b) the 
closest Dog and (c) the Exit. A Dog’s input 
includes information for only one neighbor Dog as 
this constitutes the minimal information for 
emerging teamwork cooperative behaviors. We 
deliberately exclude from consideration any global 
sensing, e.g. information about the dispersion of 
the Dogs as a whole, because we are interested 
specifically in the minimal sensing scenario. 
 
As previously mentioned, a multi-layered fully 
connected feedforward ANN has been used for the 
experiments presented here. The hyperbolic 
tangent sigmoid function is employed at each 
neuron. The ANN’s output is a two dimensional 
vector which represents the Dog’s chosen motion 
in X, Y coordinates. 
 
Fixed strategy Dogs 
 
Apart from the neural controlled Dogs, an 
additional fixed non-evolving strategy has been 
tested for controlling the Dogs’ motion. Dogs of 
this strategy are called ‘Followers’ and they are 
designed to follow the Player constantly by 
moving at half the Player’s speed (i.e. 1.0 
cm/simulation step). This strategy is used as a 
baseline behavior for comparison with any 




In order to find, as objective as possible, a measure 
of interest in the Dead End computer game we first 
 need to define the criteria that make a game 
interesting. Then, second, we need to quantify and 
combine all these criteria in a mathematical 
formula. The game should then be tested by human 
players and have this formulation of interest cross 
validated against the interest the game produces in 
real conditions. This last part of our investigation 
constitutes a crucial phase of future work. 
 
In order to simplify this procedure we will ignore 
the graphics’ as well as the player’s contribution to 
the interest of the game and we will concentrate on 
the Dogs’ behavior that effects the game’s interest. 
That is because, we believe, the computer-guided 
opponent character contributes the vast majority of 
features that make a computer game interesting. 
 
By being as objective and generic as possible, we 
believe that the criteria that collectively define the 
interest of the Dead End game are as follows (see 
also (Yannakakis and Hallam 2004) for interest 
criteria definitions for the  Pac-Man game). 
 
• When the game is neither too hard nor too 
easy. In other words, the game is 
interesting when Dogs manage to kill the 
player sometimes but not always. In that 
sense, optimal behaviors are not interesting 
behaviors and vice versa. 
 
• When there is diversity in Dogs’ behavior 
over the games. That is, when Dogs are 
able to find different ways of hunting and 
killing the player in each game so that their 
strategy is less predictable. 
  
• When Dogs’ behavior is aggressive rather 
than static. That is, Dogs that move 
towards killing the player but meanwhile, 
move constantly all over the game field 
instead of simply following it. This 
behavior gives player the impression of an 
intelligent strategic Dogs’ plan which 
increases the game interest. 
 
In order to estimate and quantify each of the 
aforementioned criteria of the game’s interest, we 
follow the same procedure introduced in 
(Yannakakis and Hallam 2004). Thus, the metrics 
for the three criteria are given by T (difference 
between maximum and average player’s lifetime 
over N games --- N is 50 in this paper), S (standard 
deviation of player’s lifetime over N games) and 
}{ nHE  (stage grid-cell visit average entropy of 
the Dogs over N games) respectively. All three 







}{ nHESTI                    (1) 
 
where I is the interest value of the Dead End game; 
εδγ  and , are criterion weight parameters (for the 
experiments presented here 1,2,1 === εδγ ). 
 
The measure of the Dead End game’s interest 
introduced in (1) can be effectively applied to any 
predator/prey computer game (e.g. see 
(Yannakakis and Hallam 2004)) for a successful 
application on the Pac-Man game) because it is 
based on generic quantitative features of this 
category of games. These features include the time 
required to kill the prey as well as the predators’ 
entropy throughout the game field. We therefore 
believe that (1) --- or a similar measure of the 
same concepts --- constitutes a generic interest 
approximation of predator/prey computer games. 
In fact, the two first criteria correspond to any 
computer game whereas the third criterion 




We use an off-line evolutionary learning approach 
in order to produce some ‘good’ (i.e. in terms of 
performance) initial behaviors for the on-line 
learning mechanism. The ANNs that determine the 
behavior of the Dogs are themselves evolved 
(evolutionary process is limited to the connection 
weights of the ANN). 
 
The evolutionary procedure is as follows. Each 
Dog has a genome that encodes the connection 
weights of its ANN. A population of 40 (we keep 
this number low because of the computational 
cost) ANNs (Dogs) is initialized randomly with 
initial uniformly distributed random connection 
weights that lie within [-5, 5]. Then, at each 
generation: (a) Each Dog in the population is 
cloned 8 times. These 8 clones are placed in the 
Dead End game field and play the game against a 
selected Player type for an evaluation period T 
 (e.g. 125 simulation steps). The outcome of this 
game is to ascertain the total number of wins (W) 
and kills (K). (b) Each Dog is evaluated via (2) 
 
WKf βα −=                       (2) 
 
where K and W are the total numbers of kills and 
wins respectively; α  is the reward rate of a kill; β  
is the penalty rate of a win. (c) A pure elitism 
selection method is used where only the 20% 
fittest solutions are able to breed and, therefore, 
determine the members of the intermediate 
population. (d) Each parent clones an equal 
number of offspring in order to replace the non-
picked solutions from elitism. (e) Mutation occurs 
in each gene (connection weight) of each 
offspring’s genome with a small probability mp  
(e.g. 0.01). A uniform random distribution is used 
again to define the mutated value of the connection 
weight. 
 
The algorithm is terminated when a predetermined 
number of generations g is completed (e.g. g=300) 




This evolutionary learning approach is based on 
the idea of Dogs that learn while they are playing 
against the Player. In other words, Dogs that are 
reactive to any player’s behavior and learn from its 
strategy instead of being predictable and, therefore, 
uninteresting characters for game playing. 
Furthermore, this approach’s additional objective 
is to keep the game’s interest at high levels as long 
as it is being played. 
 
Beginning from any initial off-line trained (OLT) 
group of homogeneous Dogs, the on-line learning 
(OLL) mechanism attempts to transform them into 
a group of heterogeneous Dogs that are interesting 
to play against. The OLL procedure is as follows. 
An OLT Dog is cloned 8 times and its clones are 
placed in the Dead End game field to play against 
a selected Player type. Then, at each generation: 
 
(a) Each Dog is evaluated every T (T is 25 here) 
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'          (3) 
 
By using (3), we individually promote each Dog 
that attempts to stay as close as possible to the 
Player during an evaluation period. (b) If the 
average fitness of the population is greater than a 
fixed threshold value then, go to (a) else, continue. 
(c) A pure elitism selection method is used where 
only the fittest solution is able to breed. The fittest 
parent clones an offspring that replaces the worst-
fit member of the population. This offspring takes 
the worst-fit member’s position in the game field. 
(d) Mutation occurs in each gene (connection 
weight) of the offspring’s genome exactly as in the 
off-line learning algorithm. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The on-line learning mechanism 
 
The algorithm is terminated when a predetermined 
number of generations g is completed (e.g. 
g=5000) and all 8 Dogs’ connection weights are 
saved. Fig. (2) illustrates the main steps of the 
OLL algorithm. 
  
We mainly use small simulation periods (i.e. 
T=25) to evaluate Dogs during OLL. The aim of 
this high frequency of evaluations is to accelerate 
the on-line evolutionary process. However, the 
evaluation function (3) constitutes an 
approximation of the examined Dog’s overall 
performance for large simulation periods. Keeping 
the right balance between computational effort and 
performance approximation is one of the key 
features of this approach. We therefore use 
 minimal evaluation periods capable of achieving 




Results obtained from experiments applied on the 
Dead End game are presented in this section. 
These include, off-line and on-line learning 
emergent behavior analysis as well as experiments 





In order to evaluate the performance of a team of 
Dogs, we record the total number of both kills K 
and wins W of the examined team, against a 
specific Player, by placing these agents in Dead 
End and letting them play the game for 3105.12 ⋅  
simulation steps. We believe that this is a long 
enough period for testing a playing-behavior of a 
team of Dogs in an efficient way. This evaluation 
is called a trial. We then calculate the value P = 
100[K/(K+W)]. This performance measurement 
(P) quantifies the Player-killing (K) percentage 
over the total number of games played (K+W). 
 
Off-line Learning Experiments 
 
The experiment presented in this subsection is 
focused on producing well-behaved Dogs in terms 
of the performance measure previously described. 
We train Dogs against all three fixed-strategy 
types of Player through the off-line learning 
mechanism. In this experiment we select 
1== βα  in fitness function (2) --- providing 
equal opportunities for promoting both Player-
hunting and Exit-defensive behaviors. The off-line 
learning experiment is described as follows. 
 
(a) Apply the off-line learning mechanism by 
playing against each type of Player separately. 
Repeat the learning attempt (run) 10 times --- we 
believe that this number is adequate to illustrate a 
clear picture of the emergent behavior --- with 
different initial conditions. (b) Evaluate each one 
of the 10 teams of OLT Dogs against all three 
types of Player. Their performance and interest 
measurement are given by the average values 
obtained over the 10 trials. (c) Evaluate non-
evolving randomly generated (i.e. untrained) as 
well as Player-follower Dogs (i.e. Followers) 
against every Player type (run 10 trials and 
calculate their average performance and interest). 
The outcome of this experiment is presented in 
Table I. 
 
Table I. The effect of off-line training on the Dogs’ average 
performance (E{P}) and interest (E{I}) over 10 learning 
attempts 
 Playing against 
 RM EA CB 
 E{P}    E{I} E{P} E{I} E{P} E{I} 
OLT/RM 91.27 0.728 24.36 0.682 3.82 0.243 
OLT/EA 62.55 0.555 96.01 0.661 51.27 0.486 
OLT/CB 93.09 0.628 55.09 0.681 72.98 0.425 
Followers 98.54 0.466 78.94 0.763 71.51 0.709 
Untrained 75.58 0.401 62.46 0.498 17.77 0.425 
 
As can be seen from Table I, there is a large 
performance improvement of the OLT Dogs in 
comparison to the untrained or even the Follower 
Dogs against all three types of Player. However, in 
most cases, OLT Dogs against a specific Player 
seem to get lower average performance values 
when playing against a Player other than the Player 
they have been off-line trained against. Dogs 
trained off-line against CB Players showed good 
overall performance against all types of Players. 
Therefore, among the three fixed-strategy Players, 
the CB Player provides the best off-line training 
for the opponent agents. This suggests that when 
Dogs learn from more complex and effective types 
of Players, they tend to generalize better. 
 
An increased interest value when Dogs are trained 
off-line is also noticeable in all cases (see Table I). 
However, these emergent behaviors fail to 
compete the interest generated by the Followers in 
the majority of cases (mainly against the EA and 
CB Players). 
 
The most typical emergent behaviors are pure 
Exit-defensive or pure Player-hunting behaviors 
but hybrids also occur frequently. The off-line 
learning mechanism, in the majority of cases, 
produces Dogs that defend the Exit and/or hunt the 
Player in a cooperative fashion. As stressed before, 
opponents in this game have to learn to cooperate 
in order to be successful (achieve a high 
performance value) against any playing strategy. 
 
 On-line Learning Experiments 
 
The off-line learning procedure is a mechanism 
that attempts to produce near-optimal solutions to 
the problem of killing the Player and defending the 
Exit. These solutions will be the OLL 
mechanisms’ initial points in the search for more 
interesting games. The OLL experiment is 
described as follows. 
 
(a) Apply the OLL mechanism to all teams of OLT 
Dogs (see Off-line Learning Experiments section) 
playing against each type of Player separately. (b) 
Evaluate performance and interest values of each 
OLL attempt against each Player type. The 
outcome of this experiment is presented in Table II 
and Fig. 3. 
 
As seen from Table I and Table II, the OLL 
mechanism manages to find ways of increasing the 
interest of the game regardless of the initial OLT 
behavior or the player. Due to space considerations 
we present only 3 out of the 9 OLL experiments in 
detail here. Fig. 3 demonstrates the learning 
mechanism’s ability of producing games of higher 
than the initial interest as well as keeping that high 
interest for a long period. The mechanism 
demonstrated a similar adaptive behavior for all 9 
different OLL experiments. This suggests that the 
evolutionary approach proposed shows a behavior 
of high robustness which furthermore manages to 
generate opponents’ behaviors of much higher 
interest values. 
 
The OLL mechanism tends to be a highly 
disruptive procedure (via the mutation operation) 
for high-interest group behaviors towards 
individual rewards. Such disruptive mutations can 
cause undesired drops in the game’s interest 
generated by a team of Dogs. However, 
experiments show that Dogs trained by individual 
rewards (while playing) manage to maintain and 
even increase the game’s interest.  
 
Another important feature of the mechanism is its 
ability to quickly emerge interesting opponents to 
play against. It takes, in the worst case 
experienced, fewer than 500 OLL games for the 
mechanism to generate games of higher interest. 
 
Table II. Best average interest values achieved by applying 
on-line learning on Dogs trained off-line. The respective 
average performance values are also presented 
 Playing against – On-line learning 
 RM EA CB 
 E{P}    E{I} E{P} E{I} E{P} E{I} 
OLT/RM 86.73 0.758 36.45 0.762 43.09 0.721 
OLT/EA 95.64 0.707 84.18 0.701 20.91 0.617 
OLT/CB 97.09 0.685 53.64 0.745 60.92 0.610 
 
Fig. 3. Interest (averaging over 10 trials) evolution over the 
number of games played. . Initial behavior: OLT/RM (initial 
and best interest values are presented in the first row of Table 
I and Table II respectively. 
 
On the other hand (see Table I and Table II), in 
almost half cases, there is a decrease of the Dogs’ 
average performance values. In general, Dogs that 
achieve high-performance values do not generate 
interesting games. This illustrates the tradeoff 
between optimality and interest in any computer 
game. In Dead End, optimal killing behaviors 




The Dead End predator/prey computer game is 
devised as an interesting test-bed for studying the 
emergence of multi-agent cooperative behaviors 
supported by partial implicit communication 
through evolutionary learning mechanisms. We 
introduced an off-line learning mechanism, from 
which effective cooperative predator behaviors 
have rapidly emerged. 
 
Predator strategies in predator/prey computer 
games are still nowadays based on simple rules 
which make the game quite predictable and, 
therefore, uninteresting --- by the time the player 
 gains more experience and playing skills. A 
computer game becomes interesting primarily 
when there is an on-line interaction between the 
player and his opponents who demonstrate 
interesting behaviors. 
 
Given some objective criteria for defining interest 
in predator/prey games presented by Yannakakis 
and Hallam (2004) we introduced a method for 
explicitly measuring interest in the Dead End 
game. We saw that by using the proposed on-line 
learning mechanism (see also (Yannakakis et al. 
2004)), maximization of the individual simple 
distance measure (see (3)) coincides with 
maximization of the game’s interest. Apart from 
being robust, the proposed mechanism 
demonstrates fast adaptability to new types of 
player (i.e. playing strategies). Therefore, we 
believe that such a mechanism will be able to 
produce interesting interactive opponents (i.e. 
games) against even the most complex human 
playing strategy. 
 
We believe that the methods used need to be tested 
on more complex Dead-End stages (i.e less Dogs) 
in order to provide more evidence for their 
generality, and the interest measure proposed 
needs to be cross-validated against human players. 
In addition, investigation of the heterogeneity’s 
contribution on these results constitutes an 
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